2 Jul 2007: ACCURATE/USENIX EVT ’07
The EVT ’07 workshop, co-sponsored by ACCURATE and USENIX, is now open for registration. Register online by Friday, July 27, 2007.
Read on for more information.
The EVT ’07 workshop, co-sponsored by ACCURATE and USENIX, is now open for registration. Register online by Friday, July 27, 2007.
Read on for more information.
David Dill and Dan Wallach recently wrote a report discussing open research issues in Florida’s 13th Congressional District.
ACCURATE PI Dan Wallach testified before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on February 7. His testimony is now online. Also of interest to readers of this site, Princeton professor Ed Felten recently testified before the Committee on House Administration’s Subcommittee on Elections. In his blog, he discusses both his main testimony and supplemental testimony.
David Wagner (an ACCURATE member) recently testified before the US House of Representatives at a hearing of the Elections Subcommittee of the Committee on House Administration. Wagner’s written testimony addresses the issue of public disclosure of voting system source code.
An independent team of experts, led by Florida State University, released a report on the ES&S iVotronic voting machines used in Sarasota County, Florida during the contested Congressional District 13 race last November. The FSU report was commissioned by the Florida State Division of Elections. The report’s authors included ACCURATE PI David Wagner.
We are currently accepting paper submissions for the The 2nd EVT Workshop to be held Monday, August 6, 2007, co-located with the 16th USENIX Security Symposium in Boston, Massachusetts. For more information please visit the CFP site.
This past year was a very busy and productive year for ACCURATE. Our Annual Report describes the major highlights from the center’s activities during the year.
Direct-recording electronic voting systems from several major vendors, including Diebold, ES&S, and Sequoia, have touch-sensitive screens. The screen shows pictures of buttons with labels for the various candidates, which the voter selects by touching the screen with their finger. Some voters using these machines have reported problems where they pressed the button for one candidate and a different candidate was selected. These issues are most likely the result of poor touchscreen calibration rather than any security problems with the voting machines’ software.
Today ACCURATE submitted a public comment to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) on the draft Voting System Testing & Certification Program (VSTCP) Manual. The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Verified Voting Foundation endorsed the comment.
The VSTCP Manual is an important document. When finalized, it will essentially be the rulebook that the EAC, vendors, and test labs will follow throughout the testing and certification process. The Manual also outlines the EAC’s approach to publishing testing- and certification-related information, as well as how and when the EAC will solicit information from the public. The Manual also acknowledges some of the critical purposes of the federal process: to support state and local election officials and to increase voter confidence.
A group from the University of Connecticut recently performed a study of the Diebold AccuVote-OS (precinct-based optical scanner), finding significant vulnerabilities. Avi Rubin’s blog discusses their findings. Also, a Dutch election official recently banned use of the SDU DRE voting system, apparently a follow-on to the We Don’t Trust Voting Computers study, which found a variety of security vulnerabilities with NEDAP DRE systems, including radio emissions that could be detected several meters away.